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What role do the rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) have to play as potential agents of 
systemic integration and a coherent international legal system? Part of the answer lies 
in an examination of the practice of domestic courts which are increasingly called upon 
to undertake the task of interpreting treaties. This paper compares the practice of two 
superior courts – the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia – in 
their approaches to the interpretation of international legal norms and their use of the 
interpretative principles in Articles 31 and 32. Despite the theoretical idea that the 
VCLT rules will, or should, encourage consistency of interpretation amongst varied 
interpreters, potential for divergences in interpretative technique (let alone outcome) 
remains. While both courts identify international law as a single system, and promote 
the role of Articles 31 and 32 as a means of ensuring uniformity of treaty application, 
historically the practise of the Supreme Court and High Court has been far from 
consistent, either internally or vis-à-vis each other. However, as the international 
law experience of these domestic courts grows, so too there appears to be an emerging 
consensus as to the preferred interpretative approach.
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I. Introduction
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 (“VCLT”) regulates for its parties2 a broad range of issues: from fraud and invalidity, to 
amendment and the impact of treaties on third states.3 But since its entry 
into force in 1980, it is in respect of the rules of treaty interpretation 
– Articles 31 and 32 – that the VCLT has achieved a remarkable and 
“near universal”4 acceptance. Article 31, now habitually acknowledged as 
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT].
2. Including, relevantly, Australia (accession 13 June 1974) and Canada 
(accession 14 October 1970).
3. VCLT, supra note 1 at arts 34, 39, 49; see also Eberhard P Deutsch, 
“Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” (1971-1972) 47 Notre 
Dame Lawyer 297. 
4. Duncan B Hollis, “Interpretation and International Law” (2015) online: 
Social Science Research Network at 4 <ssrn.com/abstract=2656891>. 
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customary international law,5 sets out the “general rule” of interpretation:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by 
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended.
Article 32 contains the rule in respect of supplementary means of 
interpretation:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
5. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras), 
[1992] ICJ Rep 351 at para 380; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v Chad), [1994] ICJ Rep 6 at para 41; Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v Namibia), [1999] ICJ Rep 1045 at 1059; LaGrand (Germany 
v United States of America), [2001] ICJ Rep 466 at para 99; Case 
Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia 
v Malaysia), [2002] ICJ Rep 625 at para 37; Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), [2004] ICJ 
Rep 12 at para 83; Jan Klabbers, “Virtuous Interpretation” in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias & Panos Merkouris, eds, Treaty Interpretation 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Leiden: 
Brill, 2010) 17 (However, Klabbers disagrees that rules on interpretation 
can be of a customary nature as they are “simply of a different quality” 
being “methodological devices” rather than rules guiding behaviour at 30) 
[Klabbers, “Virtuous Interpretation”].
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determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
International lawyers are intimately familiar with these terms of the VCLT 
regulating interpretation. But international courts are not the only bodies 
tasked with the application, and therefore interpretation, of international 
law;6 many international norms are no longer concerned merely with the 
interactions between States, but “aim to regulate State conduct within 
the domestic jurisdiction”.7 As such, domestic courts have become, “at 
least implicitly”, a key audience for the VCLT’s interpretive provisions,8 
as they are now regularly called upon to apply international legal norms. 
The subject considered in this paper is the use by domestic courts of the 
international law canons of interpretation.
The place of international law in domestic courts attracts significant 
scholarly interest, as does the theory of interpretation in international law. 
However, what remains relatively under-studied is the practice of domestic 
6. Jean d’Aspremont, “The Systemic Integration of International Law by 
Domestic Courts: Domestic Courts as Architects of the Consistency 
of the International Legal Order” in Ole Kristian Fauchald & André 
Nollkaemper, eds, The Practice of International and National Courts and 
the De-Fragmentation of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2012) 141 at 141; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, “Judicial Dialogue as a 
Means of Interpretation” in Helmut Philipp Aust & Georg Nolte, eds, 
The Interpretation of International Law By Domestic Courts: Uniformity, 
Diversity, Convergence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) 72 
(“Interpretation is crucial for the application of law – indeed the two 
can hardly be distinguished” at 72) [Aust & Notle, Interpretation of 
International Law].
7. Antonios Tzanakopoulos, “Domestic Courts in International Law: The 
International Judicial Function of National Courts” (2011) 34 Loyola of 
Los Angeles International & Comparative Law 133 at 138.
8. Michael Waibel, “Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed for 
and Applied by National Courts?” in Helmut Philipp Aust & Georg 
Nolte, eds, The Interpretation of International Law By Domestic Courts: 
Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016) 10 at 13 [Waibel, “Principles of Treaty Interpretation”].
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courts;9 the quirks (or qualms) that can arise in the final judgment when 
issues of international law have been argued. This paper will consider 
and compare the practice of two superior courts – the Supreme Court 
of Canada and the High Court of Australia – in their approaches to 
the interpretation of international legal norms and their use of the 
interpretative principles in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. It undertakes 
to provide an illustrative snapshot of some themes, points of interest, and 
points of divergence which have emerged in the jurisprudence of both 
States, rather than a comprehensive doctrinal analysis.
Given the limited scope of this paper, there are a number of important 
issues which cannot be considered. First, the potential influence of 
international law in the interpretation of each States’ Constitution is 
a matter for domestic jurisprudence and constitutional law theorists. 
Second, anterior questions regarding the proper role of international law 
in domestic law are not addressed. For present purposes, it is sufficient 
that as a matter of fact international treaty norms are adopted into 
domestic law by the various mechanisms set out in Section III below. 
Third and finally, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of this paper is 
on the art of interpretation,10 and not on the outcome of any particular 
act of interpretation. That is, no claims are made as to the accuracy or 
otherwise of the Courts’ conclusions on any of the substantive issues of 
law raised in the case law discussed below.
9. But see Helmut Philipp Aust, Alejandro Rodiles & Peter Staubach, “Unity 
or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and Treaty Interpretation” (2014) 27 
Leiden Journal of International Law 75 (in which the authors review the 
courts of the European Union, Mexico and the United States) [Aust et 
al, “Unity or Uniformity?”]. See also, for an earlier review of domestic 
practise Christoph H Schreuer, “The Interpretation of Treaties by 
Domestic Courts” (1971) 45 British Year Book of International Law 255. 
See also generally, Aust & Nolte, Interpretation of International Law, supra 
note 6; Waibel, “Principles of Treaty Interpretation”, ibid at 20.
10. Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 16th Sess, Supp 
No 9, UN Doc A/CN.4/173 (1964) at 200; Richard Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) (“Those who 
would practise the art need to understand the rules” at 5).
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A. Why Canada and Australia?
Canada and Australia should be considered members of the same 
epistemic community,11 as they share some remarkable similarities in 
their legal cultures, particularly vis-à-vis the relationship of domestic 
law to international law. These similarities make a comparative study 
particularly insightful, as differences of approach which may become 
apparent cannot be dismissed on the grounds of mere cultural relativism. 
Both are federal States,12 sharing a similar political history as former British 
colonies.13 Both confer distinct roles on the executive and Parliament in 
respect of treaties and may be described as traditionally dualist.14 The 
historical antecedent of both States’ approach to international law is set 
out clearly in Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Ontario 
(Labour Conventions), a decision of the Privy Council binding in Canada 
and influential in Australia, in which Lord Atkin stated:
It will be essential to keep in mind the distinction between (1) the formation, and 
(2) the performance, of the obligations constituted by a treaty, using that word 
as comprising any agreement between two or more sovereign States. Within 
the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty 
11. Michael Waibel, “Interpretive Communities in International Law” in 
Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds, Interpretation in 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 148 at 153 
[Waibel, “Interpretive Communities”].
12. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), s 9; Constitution 
Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1895, Appendix II, 
No 5; Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11; Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
13. In the case of the geographical area now comprising the province of 
Quebec, post-1763: George R, Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo 
III), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 1.
14. Canada and Australia take dramatically different approaches to the 
reception of customary international law, however that is not relevant for 
present purposes, but see Nulyarimma v Thompson, [1999] FCA 1192 
[Nulyarimma]; R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, at paras 36-9 [Hape]. Although 
as noted in James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of 
International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2014), classifying a State’s constitutional 
design as either monist or dualist is “not so much an exercise in absolutes 
as a matter of degree” at 164) [Crawford, Chance]. 
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is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations,  if they entail 
alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.15 
Finally, Canada and Australia are both parties to the VCLT.16 As 
such, both are members of the same “interpretative community”, and 
their superior courts’ jurisprudence has an important role to play in 
contributing to understanding the function, utility, and importance of 
the VCLT in domestic courts.17
B. Structure of this Paper
Section II begins with the underlying question of the role of the VCLT 
as a tool of greater systemic integration in international law; this is the 
question to which the review of court practice will seek to provide an 
answer. Section III investigates the perception held by the Supreme 
Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia that international 
law is a single system of law, observing that both courts recognise the 
importance of uniform treaty interpretation, and the role that the VCLT 
rules have to play in promoting that outcome. Section IV turns to assess 
the attitudes of each court with respect to the application of international 
legal norms. It will be seen that the High Court has generally exhibited 
“hesitation towards treating international law as a legitimate and useful 
source of legal ideas, reasoning and principles”18 while the Supreme 
Court, by contrast, has demonstrated a “muddled enthusiasm for 
international law”.19 The analysis concludes in Section V by considering 
how the respective attitudes of the courts as set out in Sections III and 
IV have influenced their approaches to interpretative methodology under 
the VCLT. While sharply divergent for some time, in the most recent case 
15. [1937] AC 326 at 34748.
16. Supra note 2.
17. On interpretative communities generally, see Waibel, “Interpretive 
Communities”, supra note 11.
18. Michael Kirby, “The Growing Impact of International Law on the 
Common Law” (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 7 at 22.
19. Karen Knop, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts” 
(2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
501 at 515.
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law the courts appear to be converging in their approach, as will be seen 
in Section VI. Finally, Section VII sets out some tentative conclusions 
that may be drawn from the review regarding the role of domestic courts, 
and the international rule of law.20
II. International Law as a Legal System: The Role of 
the VCLT in Promoting Systemic Integration
That international law “is a legal system”21 is a controversial opening 
gambit. But despite ever growing concerns regarding the fragmentation 
of international law, there is strong evidence of international law being a 
single system. In 1923 James Brown Scott, Director of the International 
Law Division of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote 
that “[a] system of law to be applied between nations exists”.22 In 2012, 
Judge Greenwood averred in Diallo (Compensation) that international 
law is “not a series of fragmented specialist and self-contained bodies 
of law [but] a single, unified system”,23 and Pauwelyn has observed that 
while “in their treaty relations states can ‘contract out’ of one, more or, 
in theory, all rules of international law (other than those of jus cogens), 
… they cannot contract out of the system of international law”.24 Indeed 
the mere existence of norms with the status of jus cogens suggests the 
20. Aust et al, “Unity or Uniformity?”, supra note 9 at 111.
21. Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 58th Sess, Supp 
No 10, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006) at 407-08. See also Martti Koskenniemi, 
“The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics” 
(2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1.
22. James Brown Scott, “Annual Report of the Director of the Division 
of International Law ” in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Yearbook (Washington: The Endowment, 1923) 235 at 237.
23. Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), Declaration of Judge Greenwood, [2102] ICJ Rep 
391 at para 8.
24. Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at 37. See also Crawford, Chance, supra note 14 at 
138, 145.
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existence of a Raz-ian “intricate web … of interconnected laws”,25 or 
at least that international law is more than simply a series of disjointed 
parallel norms.
However, the question with which we are particularly interested 
is not the status of international law as a legal system as a matter of 
jurisprudence per se, but the role of the rules of interpretation in VCLT 
Articles 31 and 32 as a potential agent of systemic integration and a 
coherent international legal system. 
The idea behind systemic integration goes something like this: 
international law is a legal system, made up of a large body of primary rules 
in the form of treaty and customary law, which are in turn “moderated” 
by common (secondary) rules of interpretation.26 The very use of those 
secondary rules of interpretation can contribute to harmonization27 and 
enhance legal certainty,28 by amongst other things, promoting stability 
by making a court’s decisions more predictable, and resolving conflicts 
between different primary norms.29 
The VCLT is a treaty about treaties; a regime of secondary rules.30 
As neatly expressed by McLachlan: “[t]he rules of interpretation are 
themselves one of the means by which the system as a whole gives form 
and meaning to individual rules”.31 But behind this lies the question of 
“how this legal system shall be understood”, as asked by Aust et al: 
25. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 78-
79.
26. Crawford, Chance, supra note 14 at 140 citing Raz, ibid at 183.
27. Chester Brown, The Common Law of International Adjudication (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 12.
28. Panos Merkouris, “Introduction: Interpretation is a Science, Is an Art, Is a 
Science” in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias & Panos Merkouris, eds, 
Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 
Years On (Leiden: Brill, 2010) 1 at 10.
29. Aust et al, “Unity or Uniformity?”, supra note 9 at 79. See generally 
Campbell McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and 
Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention” (2005) 54 International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 279 at 280.
30. See Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept of Law, 3d (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2012) at 76.
31. McLachlan, supra note 29 at 282.
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[I]s it premised on an all-encompassing uniformity of interpretation, i.e. the 
goal that all relevant actors are supposed to interpret international obligations 
in exactly the same way? Or is it sufficient that the international legal system is 
held together by some common rules which ensure systemic unity at a general 
level, but allow for deviation and pluralism in specific situations?32
Naturally, scholars differ. Waibel argues that there is a “crucial normative 
aspiration”33 underlying Articles 31 and 32, which is the uniform 
interpretation and, as a corollary, application of treaties, wherein the 
interpretative principles act as a “glue”34 to bring together the diverse 
range of potential treaty interpreters – including State governments and 
institutions, and both international and domestic courts. While by no 
means a guarantee of absolutely consistent interpretation, Articles 31 and 
32 have, he argues, an important role in “setting outer limits to what 
counts as acceptable interpretation in international law”.35
Roberts on the other hand has taken the position that the primary 
obligation on interpreters should be to interpret a treaty in the “best 
manner possible”, consistently with the principle of good faith, rather 
than “consistently with other interpreters”.36 And Klabbers, for whom 
“treaty interpretation is a non-normative, methodological device”,37 
opines that the use of interpretative devices as a tool of systemic 
integration is an overly “optimistic vision”, given that the use of the same 
interpretative devices presents a mere “simulacrum of unity”, and wide 
varieties of interpretation will still be present across the dividing lines of 
fragmented international law, such as human rights, trade, humanitarian 
law, and so on.38 
32. Aust et al, “Unity or Uniformity?”, supra note 9 at 79.
33. Waibel, “Principles of Treaty Interpretation”, supra note 8 at 10.
34. Ibid at 18.
35. Ibid at 12.
36. Anthea Roberts, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National 
Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law” (2011) 60 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 57 at 84.
37. Hollis, supra note 4 at 8, citing Jan Klabbers, “The Invisible College” (3 
March 2009), Opinio Juris On-Line Symposium: Richard Gardiner’s 
Treaty Interpretation, online: <opiniojuris.org/2009/03/03/the-invisible-
college/>.
38. Klabbers, “Virtuous Interpretation” supra note 5 at 33.
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Indeed Roberts’ point that “even when States agree on a treaty text, 
they may have adopted vague or ambiguous wording precisely to permit 
conflicting interpretations to be maintained” must be conceded as a 
political reality.39 But from a position of pure theory, the more convincing 
argument is Waibel’s: that there is a presumption underlying the VCLT 
about the desirability of uniform treaty interpretation, and that through 
their mere application the use of consistent secondary rules can and will 
contribute to the furtherance of systemic integration. Like baking a cake 
by following a recipe, applying the same interpretative methodology 
should yield a very similar result, while nevertheless leaving room for 
necessary or desirable adjustments to suit the political will or milieu of 
the interpreter; the substitution of raspberries for strawberries, if you will. 
In more conventional terms, legal texts must of necessity have some 
concrete and discrete meaning, and as potently argued by Scobbie, 
cannot be “free radicals that bear the meaning anyone chooses to put 
upon them”.40 Ultimately it is a matter of pragmatism – the terms utilised 
in a treaty must “have an identifiable meaning, or range of acceptable 
meanings, because the practice of law is an instrumental activity aimed at 
practical outcomes in the ‘real’ world”.41 Bahdi argues that “the claim that 
meaning resides in the text” would mean that there cannot be divergent 
interpretations of treaties across domestic jurisdictions.42 He suggests 
that “[i]f meaning resides in the text, then a single proper interpretation 
of a treaty must emerge. If two national court judges interpret the same 
treaty differently, then one is right while the other is wrong”.43
But this goes too far. It is not that pluralism is entirely prohibited; 
rather that at the end of the day a law must mean something, it cannot 
39. Roberts, supra note 36 at 85, citing Phillip Allott, “The Concept of 
International Law” (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 31 
at 43.
40. Ian Scobbie, “Provenance and Meaning” in M Evans, International Law, 
4d (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 64 at 65.
41. Ibid at 66.
42. Reem Bahdi, “Truth and Method in the Domestic Application of 
International Law” (2002) 15 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
255 at 259.
43. Ibid.
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mean everything. When a dispute comes before the court, the court 
cannot say “it means both X and Y”. The court must decide between 
competing interpretations, and it must do so with some modicum of 
consistency.44 And whether two identical primary norms are given the 
same interpretation will depend “in part on the question of whether they 
are governed by the same secondary rules”.45 
The use of the same secondary norms will not guarantee absolute 
uniformity of interpretation, but will at least contribute a “normative pull 
towards convergence”.46 Thus, while not a “panacea for fragmentation”,47 
the application of the rules of interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 should 
contribute to the coherence of international law as a single system by 
providing interpreters with what McLachlan calls the “master key”.48 The 
question that remains, then, is whether they do.
III. Aims of Interpretation: The Recognised 
Importance of Uniformity 
Judge Simma of the International Court of Justice has argued that the 
growing volume and importance of domestic jurisprudence concerning 
international legal issues brings with it an “increasing responsibility on the 
part of [domestic] courts to maintain the law’s coherence and integrity”.49 
While international law’s character as a single legal system continues to 
be a matter of debate for international lawyers, D’Aspremont posits 
that domestic judges “tend to construe the international legal order as a 
44. On the role of authority and continuity as the determinants of the 
character of legal interpretation, see Joseph Raz, Between Authority and 
Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 223-40.
45. André Nollkaemper, “The Power of Secondary Rules of International 
Law to Connect the International and National Legal Orders” (2009) 
Amsterdam Center for International Law Working Paper at 4, online: 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515771> .
46. Ibid at 7.
47. Bruno Simma, “Universality of International Law from the Perspective of 
a Practitioner” (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 265 at 
277.
48. McLachlan, supra note 29 at 318-19.
49. Simma, supra note 47 at 290.
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consistent and systemic order”.50 D’Aspremont continues:
This leaning of domestic judges to interpret international law in a systemic 
manner and to give it some consistency deserves some attention in that 
it undoubtedly mirrors the use of the principle of systemic integration of 
international law which is enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and relied upon by international judges.51
The practice of the High Court and the Supreme Court bears out both 
D’Aspremont’s supposition and Judge Simma’s exhortation. As noted 
above, both Canada and Australia subscribe to a dualist theory of 
international law with respect to treaty obligations: treaties binding on 
the State are not binding within it, without transformation into domestic 
law. This means that an international treaty must be directly incorporated 
into domestic law by an implementing statute, either in whole52 or in 
part.53 
The dualist theory also gives rise to a separate but related question 
regarding the potential influence of unincorporated treaty law on the 
interpretation of domestic statutes. There exists a common law principle 
that Parliament should be taken as intending to legislate in conformity 
and not in conflict with “the comity of nations and the established rules 
of international law”,54 which permits a court reference to international 
50. D’Aspremont, supra note 6 at 147.
51. Ibid.
52. For example, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309 (entered 
into force 4 November 2003) is part of Canadian federal law by virtue of 
the Carriage by Air Act, RSC 1985, c C-26, s 2, Schedule VI; and part of 
Australian federal law by virtue of the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) 
Act 1959 (Cth), s 9B.
53. For example, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) [Refugees 
Convention] which is given partial effect by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
in Australia, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 
27 in Canada.
54. Daniels v White, [1968] SCR 517 at 541; Schreiber v Canada (Attorney-
General), [2002] 3 SCR 269 at para 50. The same principle applies in 
Australia, see Zachariassen v Commonwealth, [1917] 24 CLR 166 at 181; 
Polites v Commonwealth, [1945] HCA 3, 70 CLR 60 at 68-69, 77, 80-81. 
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materials for the purposes of interpretation. In this category there is a 
subtle difference between the approach taken in Australian and Canadian 
courts. In the former, an ambiguity must be present in the domestic 
law before reference may be made to international law,55 while in the 
latter there need not be such an ambiguity, and international law may be 
considered to determine whether an ambiguity exists in the first place.56 
In each of these scenarios listed above, Nollkaemper acknowledges 
two possibilities. Either the domesticated international law becomes “part 
of a different normative universe” to be governed by different (presumably, 
national) secondary norms. Or, alternatively, “secondary rules of 
international law remain applicable to the interpretation, modification 
and termination of corresponding rules at national level”.57 The High 
Court and the Supreme Court have adopted the second approach, 
accepting almost without question both the necessity of ensuring the 
consistent interpretation of international treaties, and the authority of 
the interpretative rules in VCLT Articles 31 and 32. As expressed by 
Chief Justice McLachlin in the recent Febles case, “[i]nterpretation of an 
international treaty that has been directly incorporated into Canadian law 
is governed by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties”.58 While strictly speaking, as State organs59 the Supreme Court 
and the High Court are required to conform to binding international 
norms as a failure to do so may impose international responsibility on 
55. Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic 
Affairs, [1992] 176 CLR 1 at 38.
56. National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 
2 SCR 1324 at 1372-73; Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 
SCR 689 [Ward] and Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 [Pushpanathan].
57. Nollkaemper, supra note 45 at 7.
58. Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] 3 SCR 431 at para 
11 [Febles].
59. “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts” (UN Doc A/CN.4/L.608/Add.1 and Corr.1 and Add.2-10) in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol 2, part 1 (New 
York: UN, 2006) at 243 (UNDOC. A/56/10) [“Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”].
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the State,60 in practice a domestic courts’ non-compliance with the 
VCLT would be unlikely to result in any sanction at the international 
level. From the perspective of the domestic legal system, neither Canada 
nor Australia has implemented the VCLT as a part of its domestic law. 
The content of VCLT Article 31 is, as noted above, generally recognised 
as customary international law, and would therefore be automatically 
incorporated as part of the common law of Canada,61 and would also 
likely be considered to have been adopted into the common law of 
Australia.62 However, it appears that both the Supreme Court and the 
High Court have simply given effect to the VCLT without considering 
in any great depth its domestic status.63 It is given effect, as expressed by 
the High Court, “as a matter of law and out of comity to ensure that the 
interpretation of international treaties by Australian courts will, so far as 
possible, conform to the approach which will be taken by the courts of 
other countries in relation to the same treaty”.64 
The first Australian case to address the use of the VCLT provisions 
60. Eyal Benvenisti, “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of 
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts” (1993) 
4 European Journal of International Law 159 at 160. See also generally 
James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and “Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, 
ibid.
61. See Hape, supra note 14.
62. See Nulyarimma, supra note 14.
63. On the tendency of domestic courts to not address the legal status of 
the VCLT, see Nollkaemper, supra note 45 at 22. See also Thiel v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation, [1990] 171 CLR 338 (where McHugh J did 
observe briefly that the rules of the VCLT should be applied as custom, 
but this is as far as any analysis appears to have gone, “because the 
interpretation provisions of the Vienna Convention reflect the customary 
rules for the interpretation of treaties, it is proper to have regard to the 
terms of the Convention in interpreting the Agreement, even though 
Switzerland is not a party to that Convention” at para 12).
64. De L v Director-General Department of Community Services (NSW), [1996] 
187 CLR 640 [De L v Director].
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was Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen.65 The case was primarily addressed to 
the constitutional validity of the federal Racial Discrimination Act, and 
whether section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution conferred upon 
Parliament a general competence to legislate for the performance of treaty 
obligations. As a member of a majority answering the question broadly 
in the affirmative, Justice Brennan, as he then was, observed that since 
the statute had been enacted to give effect to Australia’s obligations under 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“ICERD”):66 
[T]o attribute a different meaning to the statute from the meaning which 
international law attributes to the treaty might be to invalidate the statute in 
part or in whole, and such a construction of the statute should be avoided. The 
method of construction of such a statute is therefore the method applicable to 
the construction of the corresponding words in the treaty.67
The perceived fundamental importance of consistent interpretation is self-
evident in this passage. The English House of Lords had long recognised 
the necessity of adopting an interpretative approach that would lead to 
uniformity of interpretation both as between an international treaty and 
the domestic legislation implementing or giving effect to that treaty, and 
65. [1982] 153 CLR 168 [Koowarta].
66. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 
January 1969).
67. Koowarta, supra note 65 at 265.
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as between various national jurisdictions.68 Brennan J in Koowarta adopts 
the same ideological position. 
However, it is apparent that the courts do not subscribe to what 
Frishman and Benvenisti have pejoratively called the “convergence 
thesis”;69 there is no perception that the Supreme and High Courts form 
part of a “hierarchical structure which puts international tribunals – 
primarily the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at its apex”.70 Rather, 
uniformity of treaty interpretation is promoted because it is simply the 
most logical approach to adopt. That the “rules of a given legal order, 
even when applied by the judiciary of another legal order, should be 
interpreted according to the principles of interpretation of the legal order 
68. Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo Mango & Co Ltd, [1932] AC 328 (HL) per 
Lord Macmillan: (“It is important to remember that the Act of 1924 
was the outcome of an International Conference and that the rules 
in the Schedule have an international currency. As these rules must 
come under the consideration of foreign Courts it is desirable in the 
interests of uniformity that their interpretation should not be rigidly 
controlled by domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that 
the language of the rules should be construed on broad principles of 
general acceptation” at 350), adopted and applied in James Buchanan 
& Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd, [1978] AC 141 
(HL) per Lord Wilberforce: (“I think that the correct approach is to 
interpret the English text, which after all is likely to be used by many 
others than British businessmen, in a normal manner, appropriate for the 
interpretation of an international convention, unconstrained by technical 
rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles 
of general acceptation” at 152). This principle was in turn accepted in 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co A/Asia Pty Ltd 
[1980] 147 CLR 142. See also Quazi v Quazi, [1980] AC 744 (HL) per 
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord 
Scarman.
69. Olga Frishman & Eyal Benvenisti, “National Courts and Interpretative 
Approaches to International Law: The Case against Convergence” (2014) 
Global Trust Working Paper 8/2014 at 3.
70. Ibid.
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in which they originate”71 is not, to domestic courts, a controversial 
proposition.72 It is the same essential rule that is applied in any domestic 
conflicts of laws situation. 
The High Court’s 1997 decision in Applicant A v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs73 serves as useful evidence. Applicant A 
concerned an application for refugee status by a Chinese couple who 
claimed that they faced persecution in the form of forced sterilisation 
under China’s “One Child Policy”. To succeed, the couple had to 
demonstrate that they fell within the definition of the term ‘refugee’ as 
set out in of section 4(1) of the Migration Act. That section provided 
that the term ‘refugee’ was to have the same meaning as it has in Article 
1 of the Refugees Convention.74 The High Court, by majority,75 held that 
the couple did not satisfy the definition of refugee on the ground that 
they did not constitute a “particular social group”. However, the Court 
held per curiam that a domestic statute which incorporates the text from 
an international treaty should be interpreted in accordance with the 
meaning in the treaty, and that the international rules of interpretation 
71. D’Aspremont, supra note 6 at 152. See also Brazilian Loans Case (France v 
United States) (1929), PCIJ (Ser A) No 21 (“Once the Court has arrived 
at the conclusion that it is necessary to apply the municipal law of a 
particular country, there seems no doubt that it must seek to apply it as it 
would be applied in that country. It would not be applying the municipal 
law of a country if it were to apply it in a manner different from that in 
which that law would be applied in the country in which it is in force” at 
para 72).
72. Even the notoriously anti-internationalist Justice Antonin Scalia once 
opined in Antonin Scalia, “Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in 
the Federal Courts” (2004) 98 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 305 (that “[w]hen federal courts interpret a treaty to which 
the United States is a party, they should give considerable respect to 
the interpretation of the same treaty by the courts of other signatories” 
because “[o]therwise the whole object of the treaty, which is to establish 
a single, agreed-upon regime governing the actions of all the signatories, 
will be frustrated” at 305).
73. [1997] 190 CLR 225 [Applicant A].
74. Refugees Convention, supra note 53.
75. Dawson, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Brennan CJ and Kirby J dissenting.
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applicable to the treaty will govern the interpretation of those domestic 
statutory provisions. Brennan, now Chief Justice, again emphasised the 
importance of ensuring uniformity of interpretation, stating: 
If a statute transposes the text of a treaty or a provision of a treaty into the 
statute so as to enact it as part of domestic law, the prima facie legislative 
intention is that the transposed text should bear the same meaning in the 
domestic statute as it bears in the treaty. To give it that meaning, the rules 
applicable to the interpretation of treaties must be applied to the transposed 
text and the rules generally applicable to the interpretation of domestic statutes 
give way.76
The importance of uniform interpretation is likewise evident in the 
extensive comparative references made by members of the High Court 
to the dissenting judgment of Justice La Forest in Chan v Canada,77 a 
1995 judgment which addressed the identical issue of whether or not 
fear of being forcibly sterilized for a violation of China’s One Child Policy 
constituted a wellfounded fear of persecution for reasons of membership 
in a particular social group.78
In Canada, the importance of uniform treaty interpretation is 
less explicit, but nevertheless can be perceived in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. One of the Courts’ leading cases on treaty interpretation 
is Pushpanathan,79 which concerned an application for refugee status 
under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as implemented by 
76. Applicant A, supra note 73 at 231 per Brennan CJ; see also per Dawson J: 
(“Deciding that question involves the construction of a domestic statute 
which incorporates a definition found in an international treaty. Such 
a provision, whether it is a definition or otherwise, should ordinarily 
be construed in accordance with the meaning to be attributed to the 
treaty provision in international law. By transposing the provision of the 
treaty, the legislature discloses the prima facie intention that it have the 
same meaning in the statute as it does in the treaty. Absent a contrary 
intention, and there is none in this case, such a statutory provision is to be 
construed according to the method applicable to the construction of the 
corresponding words in the treaty” at 239-40).
77. Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR 
593. 
78. As well as with La Forest J’s judgment in Ward, supra note 56.
79. Pushpanathan, supra note 56.
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the Immigration Act.80 The applicant had been imprisoned for conspiracy 
to traffic in heroin, and subsequent to his release on parole, issued with a 
conditional deportation order under sections 27(1)(d) and 32.1(2) of the 
Immigration Act. Deportation required a determination that the applicant 
was not a refugee, by virtue of the exclusion clause in Article 1F(c) of the 
Refugees Convention, which provides that protection under the Convention 
is not available to a person who “has been guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations”.  Justices L’Heureux 
Dubé, Gonthier, McLachlin and Bastarache held that since the purpose 
of the  incorporation of Article 1F(c) into the Immigration Act  was to 
implement the underlying Convention, an interpretation consistent with 
Canada’s obligations under the Convention must be adopted. Bastarache 
J, delivering the judgment of the majority, stated simply that: 
Since the purpose of the Act incorporating Article 1F(c) is to implement the 
underlying Convention, the Court must adopt an interpretation consistent 
with Canada’s obligations under the Convention. The wording of the 
Convention and the rules of treaty interpretation will therefore be applied to 
determine the meaning of Article 1F(c) in domestic law.81
The emphasis placed on the importance of uniformity is evident 
throughout later Australian case law, as for example in Povey v Qantas 
Airways Limited,82 where the majority stated “[i]mportantly, international 
treaties should be interpreted uniformly by contracting states”83 and in 
Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation Berhad.84 
80. RSC 1985, c I2.
81. Pushpanathan, supra note 56 at para 52. 
82. [2005] 216 ALR 427 [Povey].
83. Ibid at para 25 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; at 
para 60 per McHugh J. See also Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v 
Gamlen Chemical Co A/Asia Pty Ltd, supra note 68 at 159 per Mason and 
Wilson JJ; Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation Berhad, [1998] HCA 65, 196 CLR 161 at 186 per 
McHugh J, 213 per Kirby J [Great China Metal]; Siemens Ltd v Schenker 
International (Australia) Pty Ltd, [2004] 216 CLR 418 at 466-467 per 
Kirby J.
84. [1998] 196 CLR 161.
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Great China Metal concerned the application of the Hague Rules,85 
as incorporated into Australian federal law by the Sea-Carriage of Goods 
Act. Although it was not ultimately determinative of the appeal, much of 
the argument before the High Court concerned the meaning and effect 
of Article IV r 2(c) of the Hague Rules that: “[n]either the carrier nor the 
ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from … 
(c) perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters”.86 
The goods being carried by the MV Bunga Seroja had been damaged 
in heavy weather during the vessel’s passage across the Great Australian 
Bight. Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne in their joint judgment 
stated that: “[b]ecause the Hague Rules are intended to apply widely 
in international trade, it is self-evidently desirable to strive for uniform 
construction of them”.87
Interestingly, however, the joint judgment, along with those of Justices 
McHugh and Kirby, observed that despite the recognised importance of 
uniformity, there had been a divergence of interpretation with respect to 
the phrase “perils of the sea”. This variance was examined in great detail 
by McHugh J, who said:
The Schedule to the Sea-Carriage of Goods Act 1924 enacts the Hague Rules 
as domestic law. Prima facie, the Parliament intended that the transposed 
text should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute as it bears in the 
treaty. The guiding principles of treaty interpretation are found in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. … Primacy must be given, however, to 
the natural meaning of the words in their context, as I recently pointed out in 
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.
International treaties should be interpreted uniformly by the contracting 
States, especially in the case of treaties such as the Hague Rules whose aim is to 
harmonise and unify the law in cases where differing rules previously applied 
in the contracting States. So far, however, uniformity of interpretation has not 
85. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
Relating to Bills of Lading and Protocol of Signature, 25 August 1924, 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating 
to Bills of Lading, 25 August 1924, 120 LNTS 155 (entered into force 2 
June 1931) [Hague Rules].
86. Ibid, art 4. 
87. Great China Metal, supra note 83 at para 38 per McHugh J, at para 137 
per Kirby J.
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been a feature of the Hague Rules. In particular, courts in the United States 
and Canada on one hand and in France, Germany, England and Australia on 
the other have diverged in their approach to what causes of damage can be 
described as perils of the sea for the purpose of the Hague Rules.88
Likewise Kirby J, in his separate reasons, noted that “the Court should 
strive, so far as possible, to adopt for Australian cases an interpretation 
which conforms to any uniform understanding of the Rules found in 
the decisions of the courts of other trading countries”.89 His Honour 
continued, stating:
It would be deplorable if the hard won advantages of international uniformity, 
secured by the Rules, were undone by serious disagreements between different 
national courts. What is at stake is not merely theoretical symmetry in judicial 
interpretation. There is also the practical matter that insurance covers most 
losses occurring in the international carriage of goods by sea. … Disparity of 
outcomes and uncertainty about the Rules produce costly litigation without 
positive contribution to the reduction of overall losses to cargo. This said, the 
achievement of a uniform construction of an international standard is often 
elusive.90
As Great China Metal demonstrates, “the normative pull of principles 
of treaty interpretation may be strongest in case of treaties that seek to 
establish a uniform regime”91 such as the Hague Rules. Aust et al note that 
with respect to international agreements of “a rather technical content”, 
the treaty’s main purpose is to ensure uniformity of rules and behaviour 
among the parties. The authors note that “[t]o reach this goal, it does not 
suffice to adopt a single authoritative text – uniform application of the 
agreed rules is required”.92 This consideration is evident in the reasons 
of McLachlin CJC in Thibodeau v Air Canada,93 where Her Honour 
observed that:
In light of the  Montreal Convention’s objective of achieving international 
uniformity, we should pay close attention to the international jurisprudence 
and be especially reluctant to depart from any strong international consensus 
88. Ibid at paras 70-71.
89. Ibid at para 137 per Kirby J.
90. Ibid.
91. Nollkaemper, supra note 45 at 28.
92. Aust et al, “Unity or Uniformity?”, supra note 9 at 81.
93. 2014 SCC 67. For the facts of the case, see Section V below.
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that has developed in relation to its interpretation.94
However, as also demonstrated by Great China Metal, the mere 
aspiration of uniformity does not guarantee the result. Indeed, many are 
sceptical, or suspicious, of the possibility of truly uniform interpretation. 
Munday argues that a truly “uniform” application of treaty rules is 
unlikely as “different countries almost inevitably come to put different 
interpretations upon the same enacted words”95 – the situation that arose 
in respect of the Hague Rules in Great China Metal. Roberts suggests that 
even when domestic courts do attempt to impartially apply international 
law, identity between the two cannot be guaranteed. The domestic 
courts instead “often create hybrid international/national norms”96 
– the situation is perceived to be one of legal asymptote, where the 
international norm and the domestic norm can be incredibly similar but 
will never absolutely coincide. In the words of Karen Knop, “domestic 
interpretation of international law is not simply a conveyor belt that 
delivers international law to the people” but is instead “a process of 
translation from international to national”.97
Thus, while the application and the interpretation of international law 
by domestic courts is “not at all synonymous with greater homogenisation 
and uniformisation of international law”,98 the High Court and the 
Supreme Court – whether as an article of faith or triumph of hope over 
experience – evidently both believe in its possibility, and strive for it. 
94. Ibid at para 50.
95. Roderick Munday, “The Uniform Interpretation of International 
Conventions” (1978) 27 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
450 at 450.
96. Roberts, supra note 36 at 73. See also Nollkaemper, supra note 45 at 2-3.
97. Knop, supra note 19 at 505-06. See also René Provost, “Judging in 
Splendid Isolation” (2008) 56 American Journal Comparative Law 125 at 
126, 167-68; and Bahdi, supra note 42.
98. D’Aspremont, supra note 6 at 146.
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IV. Attitudes to International Law: Hostility and 
Hesitant Embrace99
While the High Court and the Supreme Court both recognise the 
importance of uniform treaty application (and corollary interpretation), 
the courts have demonstrated a marked difference in their attitudes 
towards the utilisation of international law. That is, despite promising, 
albeit sporadic, reference to and reliance upon the VCLT in early 
Australian case law, the High Court’s more recent jurisprudence has 
evidenced a decided hostility to the application of international law 
principles of interpretation,100 and members of the Court have attempted 
to engage the use of various “avoidance doctrines”101 to stifle the role of 
international rules of interpretation. The Supreme Court by contrast has 
embraced international law’s interpretative role in domestic law.
Evidence of this divergence is demonstrated most clearly in respect 
of the provisions of VCLT Article 31(3), which mandates – the operative 
word is ‘shall’ – that treaty interpreters take into account the following: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty; (b) any subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty; and/or (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties. 
Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3) concern either 
subsequent agreement, or subsequent practice, as between the parties 
to an international treaty. The parties are “masters of their treaty”102 
and treaty interpreters must take account of demonstrated agreements 
99. Jutta Brunée & Stephen J Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application 
of International Law by Canadian Courts” (2003) 40 Canadian Yearbook 
of International Law 3.
100. Save and except for the very recent Macoun v Commissioner of Taxation, 
[2015] HCA 44 addressed in Section V below.
101. Eyal Benvenisti, “Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of 
International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts” (1993) 4 
European Journal of International Law 159 at 161.
102. Oliver Dörr, “General rule of interpretation” in Oliver Dörr & Kirsten 
Schmalenbach, eds, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A 
Commentary (London: Springer, 2012) 521 at 554.
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between them as to the authentic interpretation of the treaty concerned. 
Sub-paragraph (c) of Article 31(3) is broader, and embodies the systemic 
approach to treaty interpretation. As expressed by Dörr: “whatever their 
subject matter, treaties are a creation of the international legal system and 
their operation is based upon that fact”.103
The Supreme Court has applied Article 31(3) as it is intended to 
be used. In Yugraneft Corp v Rexx Management Corp,104 the Court was 
required to consider the limitation period applicable to the recognition 
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the province of Alberta. 
Rothstein J, for the Court, held that the Convention105 left the matter of 
limitation periods to be determined according to the procedural law of 
the jurisdiction where recognition and enforcement was being sought – in 
this case, resulting in a limitation period of two years.106 In reaching this 
conclusion, Rothstein J, in addition to the standard recitation that, as a 
treaty, the Convention had to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose”,107 went on to state 
that:
The second reason why art. III should be viewed as permitting the application 
of local limitation periods is that this reflects the practice of the Contracting 
States. In interpreting a treaty, courts must take into account “any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation” (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, art. 31(3)). A recent study indicates that at least 53 Contracting States, 
including both common law and civil law States, subject (or would be likely 
to subject, should the issue arise) the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards to some kind of time.108
The approach adopted in Yugraneft is proper as both a matter of law and 
logic. In the first part, while recourse to travaux préparatoires under Article 
32 is clearly permitted only as a supplementary means of interpretation, 
103. Ibid at 560.
104. Yugraneft Corp v Rexx Management Corp, [2010] SCC 19 [Yugraneft].
105. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, 
10 June 1958, 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959). 
106. Limitations Act, RSA 2000, c L-12, s 3.
107. Yugraneft, supra note 104 at para 19.
108. Ibid at para 21.
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Article 31 does not designate any hierarchy as between its listed 
interpretative methods; rather the techniques were meant to constitute 
a “crucible” into which “all the various elements, as they were present 
in any given case, would be thrown”.109 This includes the mandatory 
reference to sub-paragraph 3, insofar as it is necessary or informative.
As a matter of logic, to do otherwise than consider the possibility 
of the subsequent modification of the primary rule at the international 
level, and give effect to that rule, would “disconnect the link between 
the international and the national domain that the legislature sought to 
establish”.110 The result is a logical inconsistency: the domestic court is 
faced with a domesticated international norm, the transposed text of a 
treaty in a statute. The “prima facie legislative intention is thus that the 
transposed text should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute 
as it bears in the treaty”,111 and that meaning is determined by reference 
to international rules of interpretation. But if the domestic court fails to 
take account of subsequent agreement or practice of the parties, then it 
is neither applying the international rules of interpretation nor ensuring 
that the transposed text bears the same meaning on the domestic and 
international planes.
However, this is precisely what the High Court has purported to 
do in a series of very recent cases. And it matters not merely because it 
evidences a disappointing parochialism, but because the jurisprudence of 
the Court has a role to play in the development of international law. As 
explained by Tzanakopoulos:
Courts are organs of the State, and in that sense they partake in the development 
of international law through their engagement in practice, which constitutes 
State practice, and their expression of opinio juris. When a domestic court 
interprets and applies (or does not apply) a rule of international law in a 
particular situation, it adds to the body of practice and opinio juris with respect 
109. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol 2, (UNDOC. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1) at 219-20, para 8; Gardiner, supra note 10 at 
9.
110. Nollkaemper, supra note 45 at 21.
111. A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, [1997] 190 CLR 225 at 
231.
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to the existence, content, and interpretation of that rule.112
The rationale (or “excuse”113) behind the High Court’s resistance to Article 
31(3) appears to be based in particular notions regarding the separation 
of powers doctrine.114 The best example arises in the case of Maloney 
v The Queen,115 which concerned whether alcohol management laws 
implemented on Palm Island, of which the residents are “overwhelmingly 
Aboriginal”,116 breached section 8 of the Racial Discrimination Act,117 
which gives effect to the ICERD, or whether the prohibitions with 
respect to alcohol purchase and possession could be considered “special 
measures”.118 All members of the Court acknowledged the necessity 
of referring to the Convention in interpreting the Act.119 However, the 
majority took a highly restrictive approach to the interpretation of the 
ICERD, limiting the application of the interpretative rules of the VCLT, 
in particular with respect to Article 31(3) and Article 32.
While Chief Justice French acknowledged in Maloney that the 
relevant provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act are to be construed 
“according to the meaning in the ICERD and therefore according to 
the rules of construction applicable to the ICERD by Art 31(1) of the 
[VCLT]”,120 His Honour commented that:
Difficulties can follow from the incorporation into a domestic law of criteria 
designed for an international instrument when those criteria have to be applied 
to the determination of rights and liabilities in a matter arising under that 
law  in a municipal court. … The application in a court  of criteria derived 
112. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 6 at 18.
113. Benvenisti, supra note 101 at 175.
114. Ibid at 177.
115. Maloney v The Queen, [2013] 252 CLR 168 [Maloney].
116. Ibid at para 51.
117. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 8.
118. Maloney, supra note 115 at para 51.
119. However, three Justices – Hayne, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ – did so on 
the basis that the legislation should be interpreted in accordance with 
domestic rules of statutory interpretation. The ICERD was accordingly still 
relevant, but only as a result of the application of s 15AB(2)(d) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which permits consideration of “any treaty 
or other international agreement that is referred to in the Act”.
120. Maloney, supra note 115 at para 14.
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from an international instrument may require consideration by the court of 
whether it is constitutionally competent to apply the criteria and, if so, to what 
extent. Obligations imposed by international instruments on States do not 
necessarily take account of the division of functions between their branches 
of government. The difficulty is compounded when the interpretation of the 
international instrument is said to have been subject to change by reference to 
practices occurring since the enactment of legislative provisions implementing 
it into  domestic law. Such practices may, by operation of Art 31(3) of the 
Vienna Convention, be taken into account in interpretation of the treaty 
or convention for the purposes of international law. They may lead to its 
informal modification. However, they cannot be invoked, in this country, so 
as to authorise a court to alter the meaning of a domestic law implementing a 
provision of a treaty or convention. 121
This is an extraordinary proposition: that the rules of construction in 
VCLT Article 31(1) are applicable, but those in Article 31(3) are not. It 
is a proposition that is entirely at odds with French CJ’s earlier statement 
that the Act must be construed according to the meaning in the ICERD. 
French CJ’s only explanation is a perfunctory reference to the “judicial 
function”122 which one may infer bears some relationship to the separation 
121. Ibid at para 15.
122. Ibid at para 22.
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of powers doctrine and the idea that judges are mere enforcers of law.123
In addition to French CJ’s explicit rejection of the role of Article 
31(3), the majority demonstrated “significant caution”124 if not outright 
antagonism, to the utilisation of extrinsic materials in the interpretation 
of the relevant provisions of the ICERD. The Court was referred in 
particular to the output of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, which may be considered evidence of subsequent practice 
under Article 31(3)(b). However the High Court held that to make use 
of such materials would be to adopt ‘“interpretations’ which rewrite the 
[treaty] text”;125 or, to “elevate non-binding extraneous materials over the 
123. Ibid at 185. This is a controversy beyond the scope of this paper, but 
briefly, judicial law-making is essentially retrospective in effect, and is 
tightly constrained by the judicial decision-making method. Sir Robert 
Jennings, “The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law” in Dott Milan, 
ed, International Law at the Time of its Codification: Essay in Honour of 
Roberto Ago (Milan: Giuffre, 1988) 139 at 145 (notes that where a court 
creates law “in the sense of developing, adapting, modifying, filling gaps, 
interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction” that decision must 
“be seen to emanate reasonably and logically from existing and previously 
ascertainable law” at 145). But although constrained, judges do still 
make law in a meaningful sense; see also Aharon Barak, The Judge in a 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) (“the meaning 
of the law before and after a judicial decision is not the same. Before the 
ruling, there were, in the hard cases, several possible solutions. After the 
ruling, the law is what the ruling says it is. The meaning of the law has 
changed. New law has been created” at xv). For a comprehensive analysis 
of the nature of the judicial function, see Joe McIntyre, The Nature 
of the Judicial Function (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013) 
[unpublished].
124. Patrick Wall, “Case Note: The High Court of Australia’s Approach to 
the Interpretation of International Law and its use of International Legal 
Materials in Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28” (2014) 15 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 1 at 6.
125. Maloney, supra note 115 at para 23.
48 
 
McIntyre, VCLT in Australian and Canadian Courts 
language of the text”.126 
The clearest, and perhaps the most astonishing, examples of the High 
Court’s rejection of Article 31(3) arose in the context of two extradition 
cases: Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai127 and 
Commonwealth Minister for Justice v Adamas.128 
In Zentai, Hungary sought extradition of the respondent for 
war crimes (the murder of a Jewish man) committed in Budapest in 
November 1944. Article 2.5(a) of the Treaty on Extradition between 
Australia and the Republic of Hungary required that extradition could only 
be made for an offence that was an offence in the requesting state at the 
time the acts constituting the offence were committed. The offence of 
‘war crime’ did not exist in Hungarian law until 1945, and as such, the 
High Court was required to consider whether it was sufficient that the 
alleged conduct constituted an offence under Hungarian law at the time 
(namely, murder).
The Minister had received a departmental submission prior to 
acceding to the request for extradition that “the ‘conduct-based’ 
interpretation of Art 2.5(a) of the Treaty ‘appears consistent with the 
view taken by the Hungarian Government’”,129 and that “the Ministry 
of Justice in Hungary had indicated that it believed the request was not 
precluded by Art 2.5(a) given that ‘it can be established that the action 
[allegedly] committed by Zentai was an offence even at the time of its 
commission’”.130 The Minister also relied on the mere fact of the request 
for extradition to infer Hungary’s concurrence that the requirements 
126. Ibid at para 134. The antecedent of the enmity evident in Maloney may 
be seen in the High Court’s 2006 judgments in Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004, [2006] 231 
CLR 1 [Minister v QAAH]; see also NBGM v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, [2006] 231 CLR 52 [NBGM]. However, for reasons 
of space, these decisions are not considered here.
127. Minister for Home Affairs of the Commonwealth v Zentai, [2012] 246 CLR 
213 [Zentai].
128. Commonwealth Minister for Justice v Adamas, [2013] 253 CLR 43 
[Adamas].
129. Zentai, supra note 127 at para 35.
130. Ibid.
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of Article 2.5(a) had been met. As such, before the High Court it was 
argued that there was a demonstrated subsequent agreement as between 
Australia and Hungary (pursuant to VCLT Article 31(3)) that it was 
sufficient that the alleged conduct amounted to murder. French CJ 
rejected this submission, stating: 
For the purposes of Australian domestic law … the Treaty is to be interpreted 
in the light of its text, context and purpose as at the time that [the domestic 
law] was made and by reference to such extrinsic material as was in existence at 
that time. Any later agreement which had the effect of varying the terms of the 
Treaty would not affect the application of the Act. 131
As in Maloney, French CJ rejects outright the role of Article 31(3) in 
interpretation, despite placing reliance on Article 31(1). His Honour takes 
a decidedly static view of both domestic and international law, asserting 
that even in the context of a purely bilateral treaty, the subsequent 
practice of the State parties has no bearing on the interpretation of 
the domestic statute – notwithstanding that the very reason for the 
existence of the domestic statute is to give effect to the underlying treaty. 
The joint judgment of Justices Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell in 
Zentai goes even further – discarding entirely the role of the VCLT in the 
interpretation of Article 2.5(a):
The meaning of the limitation set out in Art 2.5(a) is to be ascertained by the 
application of ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. The limitation is 
not susceptible of altered meaning reflecting some understanding reached by 
the Ministry of Justice of Hungary and the Executive branch of the Australian 
Government.132
This is in direct opposition to the precedent established in Applicant A, 
to the effect that “the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties 
must be applied to the transposed text and the rules generally applicable 
131. Ibid at para 36.
132. Ibid at para 65.
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to the interpretation of domestic statutes give way”.133 This reversion 
to the application of domestic rules of interpretation is also out of 
step with the practise of the Supreme Court, where “one can readily 
infer” from Pushpanathan and other leading jurisprudence that “VCLT 
treaty interpretation rules take precedence over domestic interpretive 
practices”.134
In Adamas, the individual in question had been sentenced in absentia 
to life imprisonment for corruption and fraud offences. Indonesian law 
permitted the conviction of Mr. Adamas in his absence, and the trial 
procedures accorded with Indonesian law. The question for the High 
Court was whether the surrender of Mr. Adamas would be “unjust, 
oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations”.135 
Although a unanimous Court ultimately agreed with the Minister that 
extradition was permissible, in the course of their reasons their Honours 
reiterated the position adopted by French CJ in Zentai, to the effect that:
Section 11 of the Act gives force to the Treaty only to the extent of the text 
set out in the Schedule to the Regulations. Article 9(2)(b) of the Treaty as 
given force by s 11 of the Act, for that reason, could not be affected by any 
subsequent agreement or practice of Australia and the Republic of Indonesia.136
Yet despite rejecting the possibility of applying VCLT Article 31(3), the 
133. Applicant A, supra note 73 at 231; see also per Dawson J: (“Deciding 
that question involves the construction of a domestic statute which 
incorporates a definition found in an international treaty. Such a 
provision, whether it is a definition or otherwise, should ordinarily 
be construed in accordance with the meaning to be attributed to the 
treaty provision in international law. By transposing the provision of the 
treaty, the legislature discloses the prima facie intention that it have the 
same meaning in the statute as it does in the treaty. Absent a contrary 
intention, and there is none in this case, such a statutory provision is to be 
construed according to the method applicable to the construction of the 
corresponding words in the treaty” at 239-40).
134. Gib van Ert, “Canada” in David Sloss, ed, The Role of Domestic Courts 
in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 166 at 182; see also generally, Tzanakopoulos, 
supra note 7.
135. Adamas, supra note 128 at para 37. 
136. Ibid at para 31.
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Court went on to make use of Article 31(1), stating: “Article 9(2)(b) … 
is nevertheless to be interpreted for what it is: a provision of a treaty”.137 
Such an approach is, to say the least, internally inconsistent.
As such, while decidedly antagonistic to the perceived interference of 
international law in domestic interpretation, the High Court does accept 
that when it is faced with interpreting a treaty, its text is to be interpreted 
in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose. 
This leads to the third and final ‘theme’ that emerges in the comparison 
between the Supreme Court and the High Court.
V. Interpretative Methodologies: Textualism vs. 
Teleology and Travaux Préparatoires
A further point of departure between the Supreme Court and the 
High Court is evident in their respective approaches to interpretative 
methodology, despite both purporting to apply the same rules as contained 
in VCLT Articles 31 and 32. The Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
marked preference for a purposive and subjective approach, even resorting 
to the use of travaux préparatoires “possibly more so than the VCLT itself 
envisions”.138 By contrast, the High Court has emphasized the primacy of 
the text, and has generally attempted to limit the use of extrinsic material 
as much as possible.139
One of the earliest Australian examples arises in the significant 
constitutional law decision known as the Tasmanian Dams case.140 
The Tasmanian government had enacted legislation141 to support the 
construction of a hydro-electric dam on the Franklin–Gordon River. 
Following significant protests, the Commonwealth government passed 
137. Ibid at para 32.
138. van Ert, supra note 134 at 181-82.
139. Save and except for Kirby J, who during his tenure consistently advocated 
for a more purposive approach and greater utilisation of extrinsic 
materials. See Povey, supra note 82; De L v Director, supra note 64; 
Minister v QAAH, supra note 126; NBGM, supra note 126. 
140. Commonwealth v Tasmania, [1983] 158 CLR 1 [Tasmanian Dams].
141. Gordon River Hydro-Electric Power Development Act 1982 (Tas).
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the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983142 and made a 
declaration under it that listed the river as part of the Tasmanian Wilderness 
World Heritage Area, and thus protected pursuant to the World Heritage 
Convention.143 The question before the Court was whether section 
51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution, which empowers the federal 
Parliament to “make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to … external affairs”144 permitted the 
enactment of legislation in relation to international agreements to which 
Australia was a party. By a slim majority of four judges to three, the High 
Court held that Parliament could enact domestic legislation to give effect 
to Australia’s treaty obligations.
The Court was only required to interpret the World Heritage 
Convention insofar as the question arose whether Australia, as a party 
to the Convention, was obliged to take steps to ensure the protection, 
conservation and presentation of the cultural and natural heritage 
situated on Australian territory. All of the judges in substance applied a 
142. World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth).
143. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 
December 1975).
144. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth), s 51.
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dominantly textual approach to the interpretation of the Convention.145 
However, only three of the judges – two majority, one minority – 
made any reference to the interpretative rules of the VCLT in doing so. 
Murphy J stated simply that “[t]he Convention should be interpreted 
giving primacy to the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose”.146 Brennan J made his rejection of 
the use of extrinsic materials more explicit:
We were invited to refer to travaux preparatoires of the Convention in order 
to perceive the attenuation of obligatory language from the first draft of the 
Convention to its final text. In my view that invitation should be rejected. 
It accords with the Vienna Convention and with the consistent practice of 
the International Court of Justice and, earlier, of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, generally to decline reference to travaux preparatoires, for 
“there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is 
sufficiently clear in itself ”.147
Chief Justice Gibbs was more inclined towards the utilisation of travaux 
préparatoires, but only in the limited circumstances permitted by Article 
32, stating that the travaux préparatoires may be utilised either to resolve 
145. Mason J undertook a textual analysis but did not refer to the provisions 
of the VCLT see Tasmania Dams, supra note 140 at 132-136. Wilson J 
referred in broad terms to the ‘objective’ of the Convention and made 
brief reference to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment (at 188) but also undertook a textual analysis at 189-196. 
Deane J acknowledged that “[i]nternational agreements are commonly 
‘not expressed with the precision of formal domestic documents as in 
English law’ … [t]hat absence of precision does not … mean any absence 
of international obligation” but undertook only a brief survey of the terms 
of the Convention and applied no particular interpretative methodology at 
261. Likewise, Dawson J mentioned that “the Court was referred by the 
Commonwealth to a number of international instruments commencing 
in 1900 and to the travaux preparatoires” but appeared to make no real 
use of those materials in the act of interpretation, rather referring to them 
in order to ascertain that “the Convention represents the highest point in 
the international expression of concern for the preservation of the cultural 
and natural heritage of nations generally, then it is necessary to go to the 
provisions of the Convention to determine the degree of concern” at 308.
146. Tasmania Dams, ibid at 61.
147. Ibid at 35.
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an ambiguity in the text, or “to confirm the meaning which appears from 
the treaty itself ”.148  Having reviewed preliminary drafts of the World 
Heritage Convention and a recommendation issued by UNESCO at the 
time of the adoption of the Convention, Gibbs CJ observed that “[o]n the 
whole, the travaux preparatoires confirm the meaning which the words of 
the relevant articles of the Convention themselves reveal”.149
The High Court’s judgment in Applicant A also discloses the 
preference for approaching treaty interpretation as a matter of semantics. 
McHugh J considered directly whether or not the textual approach 
“should be afforded interpretative precedence”,150 finding that previous 
Australian case law had not made clear whether Article 31 “requires or 
merely allows recourse to the context, object, and purpose of a treaty in 
interpreting one of its terms”.151
Having been persuaded by the reasoning of Zekia J in Golder v United 
Kingdom,152 to the effect that a textual analysis should be considered the 
primary source of interpretation, His Honour stated that “[p]rimacy is to 
be given to the written text of the Convention but the context, object and 
purpose of the treaty must also be considered”.153 McHugh J also justified 
his approach by reference to scholarly opinion that “courts should focus 
their attention on the ‘four corners of the actual text’ in discerning the 
meaning of that text”.154 McHugh J, together with Brennan CJ, described 
this approach to treaty interpretation as being “ordered, but holistic”.155 
Likewise, Gummow J in the same case, placed emphasis on the necessity 
of the textual approach, as proposed by McHugh J:
Regard primarily is to be had to the ordinary meaning of the terms used 
therein, albeit in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of 
the Convention. Recourse may also be had to the preparatory work for the 
148. Ibid at 77.
149. Ibid at 88.
150. Applicant A, supra note 73 at 253.
151. Ibid at 254.
152. Golder v United Kingdom, [1975] 1 EHRR 524.
153. Applicant A, supra note 73 at 254.
154. Ibid at 255, referring to Joseph Gabriel Starke & Ivan Anthony Shearer, 
Starke’s International Law, 11d (Oxford: Butterworths, 1994) at 435-436.
155. Ibid at 231.
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treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, whether to confirm the meaning 
derived by the above means or to determine a meaning so as to avoid obscurity, 
ambiguity or manifestly absurd or unreasonable results. However, as McHugh 
J demonstrates by the analysis of the subject in his reasons for judgment, with 
which I agree, it is important to appreciate the primacy to be given to the text 
of the treaty.156
Later cases placed a gloss on McHugh’s judgment, making more explicit 
the necessity of giving primacy to the text of the treaty.157 As explained 
by the Court in its unanimous judgment in Morrison v Peacock: “[t]he 
need to give the text primacy in interpretation results from the tendency 
of multilateral treaties to be the product of compromises by the parties 
to such treaties”.158 
The approach taken by the High Court is not without support 
in international legal scholarship. Crawford, in the latest edition of 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, suggests that “only the 
textual approach is recognized in the VCLT: Article 31 emphasizes the 
intention of the parties as expressed in the text, as the best guide to their 
common intention”.159 Early jurisprudence of the International Court 
likewise supported such an approach, as was stated in the 1950 Advisory 
Opinion Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United 
Nations: “[i]f the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning 
make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter”.160 In later 
cases, the International Court has emphasised that interpretation must 
be based “above all upon the text of the treaty”.161
The emphasis placed on the text of the treaty by the High Court may 
156. Ibid at 277.
157. Great China Metal, supra note 83; Western Australia v Ward, [2002] 213 
CLR 1; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents 
S152-2003, [2004] 222 CLR 1.
158. Morrison v Peacock, [2002] 210 CLR 274 at 279.
159. James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8d 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 379.
160. Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, [1950] ICJ Rep 4 at 8. 
161. Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad), [1994] ICJ Rep 6 at para 4; Legality of 
the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium) Preliminary Objections, 
[2004] ICJ Rep 279 at para 100.
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be contrasted with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court, where 
a much greater emphasis has been placed on ascertaining the purpose 
of the international instrument by reference to extrinsic materials. For 
example, in Thomson v Thomson, La Forest J observed that: 
It would be odd if in construing an international treaty to which the legislature 
has attempted to give effect, the treaty were not interpreted in the manner 
in which the state parties to the treaty must have intended. Not surprisingly, 
then, the parties made frequent references to this supplementary means of 
interpreting the Convention, and I shall also do so. I note that this Court has 
recently taken this approach to the interpretation of an international treaty in 
Ward v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration).162
In Pushpanathan, Barastache J suggested that the “starting point of the 
interpretative exercise is, first, to define the purpose of the [Refugees] 
Convention as a whole”163 and only then to consider the purpose of 
particular articles within the Convention – in that case, Article 1F(c) 
prohibiting the recognition as a refugee of any person who has been guilty 
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Barastache J emphasised that the “overarching and clear human rights 
object and purpose is the background against which interpretation of 
individual provisions must take place”.164
Having thus noted the “human rights character”165 of the Convention, 
the interpretation of Article 1F(c) undertaken by Barastache J was 
strongly influenced by the travaux préparatoires, in particular the debates 
in respect of that provision in the Social Committee of the UN Economic 
and Social Council during the treaty’s negotiation, UN resolutions, and 
162. Thomson v Thomson, 3 SCR 551 at para 42. See also Connaught 
Laboratories Ltd v British Airways (2002), 61 OR (3d) 204 (ONSC) 
per Molloy J (where the same idea has also been neatly expressed: the 
“objective of having uniform regulations limiting the liability of carriers 
would be seriously weakened if the courts of every country interpreted 
the Convention without any regard to how it was being interpreted and 
applied elsewhere. This potential problem supports an approach favouring 
consistency of interpretation among nations, rather than one in which 
each country applies its own domestic principles” at para 46). 
163. Pushpanathan, supra note 56 at para 56.
164. Ibid at para 57.
165. Ibid.
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jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. Indeed, His Honour 
was particularly critical of the court below for “according virtually no 
weight to the indications provided in the travaux préparatoires”.166 Rather, 
Barastache J considered “[t]he purpose and context of the Convention as 
a whole, as well as the purpose of the individual provision in question 
as suggested by the travaux préparatoires, provide helpful interpretative 
guidelines”.167
His Honour concluded that the purpose of Article 1F(c) was “to 
exclude those individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systemic 
violations of fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in 
a non-war setting”168 or for acts “explicitly recognized as contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations”.169 Having found that the 
drug trafficking offences for which the applicant had been imprisoned 
did not come “close to the core, or even [form] a part of the corpus 
of fundamental human rights”,170 Barastache J held that the applicant’s 
appeal should be successful, as conspiring to traffic in a narcotic was 
not a violation of Article 1F(c). van Ert has suggested that the approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Pushpanathan is “arguably too quick 
to turn to the travaux, which, it must be remembered, are described in 
Article 32 as ‘supplementary means of interpretation’”.171 However, the 
approach to interpretation adopted therein continues to be influential,172 
and has never been explicitly rejected.
166. Ibid at para 55.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid at para 64.
169. Ibid at para 65.
170. Ibid at para 72.
171. van Ert, supra note 134 at 179.
172. See for example, the approach adopted in Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 per Lebel, Fish JJ; Peracomo Inc v TELUS 
Communications Co, 2014 SCC 29 per Cromwell J; see also the dissenting 
opinions of Abella J in Febles, supra note 58; Thibodeau v Air Canada, 
2014 SCC 67 [Thibodeau]. 
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VI. The Future of Interpretation: From Divergence to 
Convergence?
As can be seen from the points of departure between Australian and 
Canadian practice, end-users of the VCLT’s interpretative rules are 
granted “substantial leeway for idiosyncratic approaches” to treaty 
interpretation.173 However, despite early inclinations towards different 
emphases in interpretative methodology, and despite the noted hostility 
of the High Court as compared to the more enthusiastic application 
of international law by the Supreme Court, it appears that the recent 
jurisprudence of both courts with respect to interpretation under the 
VCLT is showing signs of convergence.
Beginning with two cases handed down by the Supreme Court 
within days of each other, Febles v Canada and Thibodeau v Air Canada,174 
the majority of Justices appear to have moved towards adopting a more 
textual approach to treaty interpretation.
The first case,175 like Pushpanathan, concerned the interpretation 
of Article 1F of the Refugees Convention; however in Febles the question 
was not whether an applicant for refugee status could be excluded on 
the grounds of Article 1F(c) for having committed acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations, but rather concerned sub-
paragraph 1F(b) – exclusion for reason of having committed a “serious 
non-political crime”.176
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, took a much more 
structured approach than Barastache J in Pushpanathan, wherein Bastarche 
J eschewed immediate reference to the purposes of the Convention 
and demonstrated overreliance on the travaux préparatoires. Rather, 
McLachlin CJC made clear that “the point of departure for interpreting 
173. Michael Waibel, “Demystifying the Art of Interpretation” (2011) 22 
European Journal of International Law 571 at 573.
174. Febles, supra note 58 and Thibodeau, supra note 172.
175. Although actually the second, chronologically.
176. Febles, supra note 58 at para 134; as incorporated in Canada by s. 98 of 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27.
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a provision of a treaty is the plain meaning of the text”.177 Following 
ascertainment of the ordinary meaning of the terms used, the “second 
interpretive consideration is the context”178 of Article 1F as a whole – 
being in the nature of an exclusion provision. Thirdly, McLachlin CJC 
looked to the object and purpose of the Refugees Convention and Article 
1F(b) in particular, ultimately concluding that the exclusion “is central 
to the balance the Refugee Convention strikes between helping victims 
of oppression by allowing them to start new lives in other countries 
and protecting the interests of receiving countries”.179 In reaching this 
conclusion, McLachlin CJC emphasised that:
While exclusion clauses should not be enlarged in a manner inconsistent with 
the Refugee Convention’s broad humanitarian aims, neither should overly 
narrow interpretations be adopted which ignore the contracting states’ need 
to control who enters their territory. Nor do a treaty’s broad purposes alter 
the fact that the purpose of an exclusion clause is to exclude. In short, broad 
purposes do not invite interpretations of exclusion clauses unsupported by the 
text.180
Together with this greater emphasis on the text, what is most fascinating 
in McLachlin CJC’s judgment is her explicit rejection of any reliance on 
the travaux préparatoires. Her reasoning merits extended quotation:
As discussed, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides for interpretation 
of treaty provisions in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms in 
their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Article 32 only 
allows for recourse to ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ — including the 
Travaux préparatoires — in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
These conditions for use of the Travaux préparatoires are not present in this 
case. With great respect to Justice Abella’s contrary view, the meaning of Article 
1F(b) is clear, and admits of no ambiguity, obscurity or absurd or unreasonable 
177. Febles, ibid at para 16.
178. Ibid at para 19.
179. Ibid at para 35.
180. Ibid at para 30.
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result. Therefore, the Travaux préparatoires should not be considered.181
In this respect in particular, McLachlin CJC’s judgment echoes that 
of Brennan J in the much earlier Tasmanian Dams case, that “there is 
no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention 
is sufficiently clear in itself ”.182 McLachlin CJC’s structured approach, 
beginning with the text of the treaty and working through the other 
elements of Article 31(1), is likewise akin to the “ordered, but holistic” 
approach advocated by the High Court in Applicant A. 
In the second case, Thibodeau, Air Canada had failed to provide 
services in French on some international flights as it was obliged to do 
under the Official Languages Act.183 The majority held, however, that the 
uniform and exclusive scheme of damages liability for international air 
carriers established under the Montreal Convention did not permit an 
award of damages despite there having been a breach of language rights. 
Cromwell J, writing for the majority, adopted the same structure in his 
judgment as McLachlin CJC employed in Febles: placing the text of the 
treaty first in the interpretative approach, followed by object and purpose, 
and finally considering international jurisprudence.184
In both Febles and Thibodeau, Justice Abella dissented – joined by 
Cromwell J in the former and Wagner J in the latter – advocating for 
a continuation of the purposive approach to treaty interpretation. In 
Febles, Abella J argued that “the human rights approach to interpretation 
mandated by the Vienna Convention’ required a ‘less draconian’ 
interpretation of Article 1F(b) than that adopted by the majority”.185 In 
particular, Abella J placed emphasis on the ‘good faith’ and ‘object and 
purpose’ aspects of the interpretative rules in Article 31(1), diminishing 
181. Ibid at paras 38-39. McLachlin CJC undertook a brief consideration 
of the travaux in any event, finding that they supported the conclusion 
already reached on the textual analysis: at paras 40-42.
182. Tasmania Dams, supra note 140.
183. RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp).
184. Thibodeau, supra note 172 at paras 36-57.
185. Febles, supra note 58 at para 74 per Abella J (Abella and Cromwell JJ in 
dissent).
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the reference to the ‘ordinary meaning’ requirement,186 and made 
extensive reference to the judgment of Barastache J in Pushpanathan. But 
most relevantly, she was critical of the majority for rejecting any role for 
the travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of Article 1F(b).187 Likewise 
in Thibodeau, Abella J observed that:
The process of treaty interpretation is a process of discernment. The literal 
meaning of the words is rarely reliably able to yield a clear and unequivocal 
answer. The intention of state parties must therefore be discerned by using a 
good faith approach not only to the words at issue, but also to the context, 
history, object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.188
Down under, the High Court’s most recent effort at grappling with 
the VCLT appears to have overcome much of the latent hostility to 
the utilisation of extrinsic materials in treaty interpretation. Macoun v 
Commissioner of Taxation189 concerned income tax; particularly, whether 
the pension of Mr. Macoun, who had worked as a sanitary engineer for the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was subject to 
taxation. Regulations promulgated under the International Organisations 
(Privileges and Immunities) Act190 and Specialized Agencies (Privileges and 
Immunities) Regulations191 granted immunity from taxation to salaries 
and emoluments received from an international organisation. The Act 
and Regulations give domestic effect to Australia’s obligations under the 
Agencies Convention.192 In a unanimous decision, the High Court held 
that nothing in the Agencies Convention required Australia to refrain from 
taxing Mr Macoun’s pension.193 It is instructive to set out the Court’s 
reasoning in some detail:
On the ordinary meaning of the words, the Agencies Convention does not 
prohibit States distinguishing between officers and former officers and 
186. Ibid at para 89.
187. Ibid at para 107.
188. Thibodeau, supra note 172 at para 140 per Abella J in dissent.
189. [2015] HCA 44 [Macoun].
190. 1963 (Cth), s 6(1)(d)(i).
191. 1986 (Cth), reg 8(1).
192. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 21 
November 1947, [1988] ATS 41 (entered into force 2 December 1948).
193. Macoun, supra note 189 at para 82.
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does not  prohibit a State taxing a pension received by a former officer of a 
specialized agency. That construction is consistent with both State practice 
and the preparatory works. Although these materials were not debated before 
the AAT or the Full Court, they assist in the interpretation of the Agencies 
Convention.
The starting point in understanding the context of the text, object and purpose 
of the Agencies Convention is the UN Convention. … the UN Convention 
was drafted on the basis that the phrase “salaries and emoluments” did not 
extend to retirement or death benefits.
Next, the preparatory works in relation to the Agencies Convention must be 
considered. Its terms have been addressed earlier. A Sub-Committee of the 
Sixth Committee reported in 1947. It recorded that the Sub-Committee 
agreed that the immunity from suit in Section 19(a) would continue after the 
officials had ceased to be officials. …
As seen earlier, the officials of the UN were not to get an exemption from 
taxation on their pensions. In each preparatory work, the taxation exemption 
was not extended to pensions.
Next, the State practice of parties to the Agencies Convention in dealing with 
exemption from taxation for periodic pensions must be considered. … For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to record, as is the fact, that there is still no 
generally accepted State practice with regard to the exemption of retirement 
pensions from taxation. 194
Whether through deliberate intention or careless language it is not clear, 
but the High Court’s judgment shifts from resisting the use of travaux 
préparatoires and the application of Article 31(3), to suggesting that they 
“must be considered”, albeit following the initial textual analysis.195 Wall 
suggests that the different attitude of the Court may be explained by 
the retirement of certain judges from the bench who had previously 
taken highly restrictive approaches to treaty interpretation,196 as well as 
the fact that the treaty and travaux préparatoires at issue in Macoun were 
more prosaic than in the cases dealing with treaty instruments related to 
194. Ibid at paras 74-82 [emphasis in original].
195. Ibid at paras 78, 80.
196. Patrick Wall, “A Marked Improvement: The High Court of Australia’s 
Approach to Treaty Interpretation in Macoun v Commissioner of Taxation 
[2015] HCA 44” (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 at 
17.
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fundamental human rights.197 
Whatever the reason, it is apparent that the most recent jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court and High Court is beginning to converge on a 
more orthodox approach to treaty interpretation: a more archetypal 
adoption of the rules in Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
VII. Conclusions 
The review undertaken above has demonstrated that the practise of the 
Supreme Court and High Court with respect to the application of the 
VCLT Articles 31 and 32 is far from consistent, either internally or vis-
à-vis each other. Despite the theoretical idea that the VCLT rules will, 
or should, encourage consistency of interpretation amongst varied 
interpreters, there in fact remains, even within the purported bounds 
of the VCLT, the potential for divergences in interpretative technique 
(let alone outcome). While both courts identify international law as a 
single system, and promote the role of the VCLT interpretative rules as a 
means of ensuring uniformity of treaty application, the methods adopted 
by each court under the “crucible”198 laid down in Article 31 have been, 
until quite recently, distinctly different. The High Court has limited 
the role for international law as a tool of interpretation, emphasising an 
austere textual approach to treaty interpretation and restricting the use 
of extrinsic materials. The Supreme Court, by contrast, has embraced the 
use of extrinsic materials as it seeks to ascertain the party’s intentions and 
take its preferred purposive approach to treaty interpretation.
Thus, having lauded their potential as agents of systemic integration, 
when examined more closely it becomes apparent that VCLT Articles 31 
and 32 are in fact an excellent (albeit, perhaps ironic) example of Allott’s 
“disagreement reduced to writing”.199 Dörr prefers the phrase “pragmatic 
compromise”.200 The High Court has described the interpretative rules 
197. Ibid at 15-17.
198. Yearbook, supra note 109 at 219-20, para 8.
199. Philip Allott, “The Concept of International Law” (1999) 10 European 
Journal of International Law 31 at 43.
200. Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach, eds, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (London: Springer-Verlag, 2012) at 522.
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as “somewhat amorphous”.201 Whatever the description, the fact is that 
the ‘general rule’ contained in Article 31 is itself open to interpretation, 
which as Waibel observes is “an illustration of the feedback loop that 
arises in interpretation”.202 Ultimately, the Supreme Court and the High 
Court, while sharing a common goal – uniform treaty application – have 
been required to interpret the scope, purpose and role of Articles 31 and 
32, and have done so with different results. 
For this reason, it cannot be said that the jurisprudence of either the 
Supreme or High Court is necessarily exemplifies the ‘correct’ application 
of VCLT Articles 31 and 32. There are ebbs and flows; some judgments 
are better reasoned than others. However, overall, as the international law 
experience of these domestic courts grows, there does appear to be some 
emerging consensus as to the preferred interpretative approach. At least 
in the courts of Canada and Australia, the dream of systemic integration 
may yet be alive.
201. Riley v Commonwealth, [1985] 159 CLR 1 at para 4 per Deane J.
202. Waibel, supra note 8 at 4-5. 
